共二題，各佔50%，考試時間總共三小時。請自行配置時間作答。

1. 假設您面對了下面的現象，請您選擇其中一項
   (a) 瑤瑞現象
   (b) 五四運動九十年
   (c) 集變遊行法與社運發展

嘗試以您自己的想法，回答以下的 所有問題 (50%)
   (1) 設計一個研究方法，研究所選擇的現象
   (2) 給予你自己對這個現象的解釋與評價
   (3) 說明你的研究方法與你的解釋理論的關係

2. 以下甲、乙二題，請擇一作答 (50%)
   甲、以下兩個部份的文字，分別出自Hannah Arendt的 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy 與“The Crisis in Culture”。請逐段說明引文的主要內容（請勿逐字翻譯），並針對全部引文作綜合評論。

The condition *sine qua non* for the existence of beautiful objects is communicability; the judgement of the spectator creates the space without which no such objects could appear at all. The public realm is constituted by the critics and the spectators, not by the actors or the makers. And this critic and spectator sits in every actor and fabricator; without this critical judging faculty the doer or maker would be so isolated from the spectator that he would not even be perceived. Or to put it another way, still in Kantian terms, the very originality of the artist (or the very novelty of the actor) depends on his making himself understood by those who are not artists (or actors). And while one can speak of a genius in the singular because of his originality, one can never speak, as Pythagoras did, in the same way of the spectator. Spectators exist only in the plural. The spectator is not involved in the act, but he is always involved with fellow spectators. He does not share the faculty of genius, originality, with the maker or the faculty of novelty with the actor; the faculty they have in common is the faculty of judgment.

... Imagination, that is, the faculty of having present what is absent, transforms an object into something I do not have to be directly confronted with but that I have in some sense internalized, so that I now can be affected by it as though it were given to me by a non-objective sense. Kant says: “That is beautiful which pleases in the mere act of..."
judging it." That is: It is not important whether or not it pleases in perception; what pleases merely in perception is gratifying but not beautiful. It pleases in representation, for now the imagination has prepared it so that I can reflect on it. This is "the operation of reflection." Only what touches, affects, one in representation, when one is uninvolved like the spectator who was uninvolved in the actual doings of the French Revolution – can be judged to be right or wrong, important or irrelevant, beautiful or ugly, or something in between. One then speaks of judgment and no longer of taste because, though it still affects one like a matter of taste, one now has, by means of representation, established the proper distance, the remoteness or uninvolvedness or disinterestedness, that is requisite for approbation and disapprobation, for evaluating something at is proper worth. By removing the object, one ahs established the conditions for impartiality.

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In the Critique of Judgement, however, Kant insisted upon a different way of thinking, for which it would not be enough to be in agreement with one's own self, but which consisted of being able to "think in the place of everybody else" and which he therefore called an "enlarged mentality" (eine erweiterte Denkungsart). The power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, and the thinking process which is active in judging something is not, like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement. From this potential agreement judgment derives its specific validity. This means, on the one hand, that such judgment must liberate itself from the "subjective private conditions," that is, from the idiosyncrasies which naturally determine the outlook of each individual in his privacy and are legitimate as long as they are only privately held opinion, but which are not fit to enter the market place, and lack all validity in the public realm. And this enlarged way of thinking, which as judgment knows how to transcend its own individual limitations, on the other hand, cannot function in strict isolation or solitude; it needs the presence of others "in whose place" it must thinking, whose perspectives it must take into consideration, and without whom it never has the opportunity to operate at all. As logic to be sound, depends on the presence of the self, so judgment to be valid, depends on the presence of others. Hence judgment is endowed with a certain specific validity but is never universally valid. Its claims to validity can never extend further than the others in whose place the judging person has put himself for his considerations. Judgment, Kant says, is valid "for every single judging person," but the emphasis in the sentence is on "judging"; it is not valid for those who do not judge or for those who are not members of the public realm where the objects of judgment appear.

That the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability in exactly the sense denoted by Kant, namely, the ability to see things not only from one's own point of view but in the
perspective of all those who happen to be present; even that judgment may be on the fundamental abilities of man as a political being insofar as it enables him to orient himself in the public realm, in the common world — these are insights that are virtually as old as articulated political experience... The difference between this judging insight and speculative thought lies in that the former has its roots in what we usually call common sense, which the latter constantly transcends. Common sense — which the French so suggestively call the “good sense”, le bon sens—discloses to us the nature of the world insofar as it is a common world; we owe to it the fact that our strictly private and subjective five senses and their sensory data can adjust themselves to nonsubjective and objective world which we have in common and share with others. Judging in one, if not the most, important activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass.

What however, is quite new and even startlingly new in Kant’s propositions in the Critique of Judgement, is that he discovered this phenomenon in the all its grandeur precisely when he was examining the phenomenon of taste and hence the only kind of judgments which, since they concern merely aesthetic matters, have always been supposed to lie outside the political realm as well as the domain of reason. ... Kant who certainly was not oversensitive to beautiful things, was highly conscious of the public quality of beauty; and it was because of their public relevance that he insisted, in opposition to the commonplace adage that taste judgments are open to discussion because “we hope that the same pleasure is shared by others,” that taste can be subject to dispute, because it “expects agreement from everyone else.”... The activity of taste decides how this world, independent of its utility and our vital interests in it, is to look and sound, what men will see and what they will hear in it. Taste judges the world in its appearance and in its worldliness; its interest in the world is purely “disinterested,” and that means that neither the life interests of the individual nor the moral interests of the self are involved here.

乙、請回答以下的所有問題

(1) 請將以下的文字譯為中文（作者與標題不必翻譯，共494字）
(2) 專可能簡單扼要的整理這些文字的論點與論證
(3) 對於這段文字和他的論點，您的看法是？

Agamben

§ 3 Language and History: Linguistic and Historical Categories in Benjamin’s Thought
in Potentialities

Here the multiplicity of historical languages is grasped in its movement toward the pure language that the 1916 essay “On Language as Such and the Language of Men” presented as their Edenic origin. Pure language now appears as what every language, in
its own way, means [vuole dire]. 14 "All suprahistorical kinship of languages," Benjamin writes, "rests in the intention underlying each language as a whole--an intention, however, which no single language can attain by itself but which is realized only by the totality of their intentions supplementing each other: pure language." 15 What is meant in language lies in every single language in expectation of flowering, from the harmony of all languages, into the one language that Benjamin defines as "the messianic end of their history." just as history tends toward its messianic fulfillment, so linguistic movement as a whole tends toward "a final, conclusive, decisive stage of all linguistic creation." 16 The task of the philosopher, like that of the translator, is to "describe" and "intimate" this single true language, which seeks to "show itself " and "constitute itself " in the becoming of languages. And at the end of the essay, this pure language is described in the decisive figure of an "expressionless word" freed from the weight and extraneousness of meaning:

To relieve it of this [meaning], to turn the symbolizing into the symbolized, to regain pure language fully formed in the linguistic flux, is the tremendous and only capacity of translation. In this pure language--which no longer means anything [nichts mehr meint] and no longer expresses anything (nichts mehr ausdrückt] but, as expressionless and creative word, that which is meant in all languages--all communication, all sense, and all intention finally encounter a stratum In which they are destined to be extinguished. 17 How are we to understand this "expressionless word," this pure language in which all communication and all meaning are extinguished? How are we to think--since this and nothing less is the task given to thinking at this point--of a word that no longer means anything, that is no longer destined to the historical transmission of a meaning? And in what sense can this word--which has necessarily extinguished the Babelic confusion of languages--furnish us with the model of the universal language of redeemed humanity, "which is understood by all humans just as the language of birds is understood by those born on Sunday"? In other words, how can human beings simply speak and comprehend speech without the mediation of meaning?

All historical languages, Benjamin writes, mean pure language. It is what is meant (das Gemeinte) in every language, what every language means to say. On the other hand, however, it itself does not mean anything; it does not want to say anything, and all meaning and intention come to a halt in it. We may thus say that all languages mean to say the word that does not mean anything.