國立交通大學 101 學年度碩士班甄試入學考試試題

科目名稱：社會與文化理論

系所班別：社會與文化研究所

考試日期：100年11月9日第1節

第1頁，共5頁

＊作答前，請先核對試題、答案卷（試卷）與准考證上之組別與考試科目是否相符！！

一、先閱讀魯迅《在現代中國的孔夫子》一文，針對與其相關或類似的台灣社會文化現象，根據你（妳）的學術訓練加以分析評論。（占五十分）
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第2頁，共5頁

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The similarities between Iraq and Darfur are remarkable. The estimate of the number of civilians killed over the past three years is roughly similar. The killers are mostly paramilitaries, closely linked to the official military, which is said to be their main source of arms. The victims too are by and large identified as members of groups, rather than targeted as individuals. But the violence in the two places is named differently. In Iraq, it is said to be a cycle of insurgency and counter-insurgency; in Darfur, it is called genocide. Why the difference? Who does the naming? Who is being named? What difference does it make?

The most powerful mobilisation in New York City is in relation to Darfur, not Iraq. One would expect the reverse, for no other reason than that most New Yorkers are American citizens and so should feel directly responsible for the violence in occupied Iraq. But Iraq is a messy place in the American imagination, a place with messy politics. Americans worry about what their government should do in Iraq. Should it withdraw? What would happen if it did? In contrast, there is nothing messy about Darfur. It is a place without history and without politics; simply a site where perpetrators clearly identifiable as ‘Arabs’ confront victims clearly identifiable as ‘Africans’.

A full-page advertisement has appeared several times a week in the New York Times calling for intervention in Darfur now. It wants the intervening forces to be placed under ‘a chain of command allowing necessary and timely military action without approval from distant political or civilian personnel’. That intervention in Darfur should not be subject to ‘political or civilian’ considerations and that the intervening forces should have the
right to shoot – to kill – without permission from distant places: these are said to be ‘humanitarian’ demands. In
the same vein, a New Republic editorial on Darfur has called for ‘force as a first-resort response’. What makes
the situation even more puzzling is that some of those who are calling for an end to intervention in Iraq are
demanding an intervention in Darfur; as the slogan goes, ‘Out of Iraq and into Darfur.’

What would happen if we thought of Darfur as we do of Iraq, as a place with a history and politics – a messy
politics of insurgency and counter-insurgency? Why should an intervention in Darfur not turn out to be a trigger
that escalates rather than reduces the level of violence as intervention in Iraq has done? Why might it not create
the actual possibility of genocide, not just rhetorically but in reality? Morally, there is no doubt about the horrific
nature of the violence against civilians in Darfur. The ambiguity lies in the politics of the violence, whose sources
include both a state-connected counter-insurgency and an organised insurgency, very much like the violence in
Iraq.

The insurgency and counter-insurgency in Darfur began in 2003. Both were driven by an intermeshing of
domestic tensions in the context of a peace-averse international environment defined by the War on Terror. On
the one hand, there was a struggle for power within the political class in Sudan, with more marginal interests in
the west (following those in the south and in the east) calling for reform at the centre. On the other, there was a
community-level split inside Darfur, between nomads and settled farmers, who had earlier forged a way of
sharing the use of semi-arid land in the dry season. With the drought that set in towards the late 1970s,
co-operation turned into an intense struggle over diminishing resources.

As the insurgency took root among the prospering peasant tribes of Darfur, the government trained and armed the
poorer nomads and formed a militia – the Janjawiid – that became the vanguard of the unfolding
counter-insurgency. The worst violence came from the Janjawiid, but the insurgent movements were also accused
of gross violations. Anyone wanting to end the spiralling violence would have to bring about power-sharing at
the state level and resource-sharing at the community level, land being the key resource.

Since its onset, two official verdicts have been delivered on the violence, the first from the US, the second from
the UN. The American verdict was unambiguous: Darfur was the site of an ongoing genocide. The chain of
events leading to Washington’s proclamation began with ‘a genocide alert’ from the Management Committee of
the Washington Holocaust Memorial Museum; according to the Jerusalem Post, the alert was ‘the first ever of its
kind, issued by the US Holocaust Museum’. The House of Representatives followed unanimously on 24 June
2004. The last to join the chorus was Colin Powell. (下略)