Diaspora, Identity and Cultural Citizenship:

The Hakkas in ‘Multicultural Taiwan’

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Introduction:

The Hakkas are a special ethnic group with a long history in mainland China. In academic circles there are different views of the Hakkas' origins, although the generally held belief is that the Hakkas come from the northern part of mainland China and moved southwards en mass on more than five occasions. The Hakkas arrived in Taiwan about 300 years ago, later than the Hokkiens. Their population is 15--18% of Taiwan, making it the second largest group.

Their long history of immigration gives certain diasporic characteristics to the Hakka people. The Hakka diaspora transcends ethnic, cultural and language boundaries. Today, while needing to maintain a strong ethnic identity to survive, Hakkas must live within a largely non-Hakka culture in which they interact with people of other ethnic backgrounds, face new cultures and lifestyles, and formulate, choose, and revise the definition of being ‘Hakkane’ in various social and political environments. The conflicts related to national identity obviously had an influence the development of Taiwanese Hakkas’ culture and identity. The period from the 1940s until the early 1970s can be seen as the phase of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan. The special history of Taiwan and the Kuomintang (KMT or Goumindang, GMD) government has led to a particularly strong emphasis on national identity. The KMT government was bidding to be ‘more Chinese than China’—the exiles keeping alive the authentic cultural traditions. During this period, the Hakkas had a much stronger identity as ‘Chinese’ as opposed to ‘Taiwanese’. Afterwards, with the decline of the KMT government, the rise of Taiwanese local consciousness and the discourse of ‘Independence from mainland China’, the Hakkas felt a new crisis of identity.
When the discourse of ‘Multicultural Taiwan’\(^1\) began to gain acceptance in the 1990s, the Hakkas began to reconsider and redefine their identity. In other words, discourses on ‘Multicultural Taiwan’ and ‘The Four Ethnic Groups’ strongly influence the ways that Hakkas define their identity in Taiwan. The process of transition from ‘Chinese Nobles’ to ‘Taiwanese Hakkas’ presents some valuable insights into how ethnic Hakkas choose and reconstitute their identity in Taiwan.

In addition, the process of democratization has made ‘citizenship’ a significant factor in the construction of a national identity in Taiwan. ‘Multicultural Taiwan’ tries to ‘include’ the Hakkas in two ways:

Firstly: by promoting and strengthening the Hakka identity;

Secondly: by protecting the collective rights of the Hakka and then expanding the concept of citizenship.

In this paper, I maintain that the Hakkas form a ‘diaspora’ in Taiwan. I argue that even through the Hakkas have attempted to redefine themselves as ‘Taiwanese Hakkas’, their status as a diaspora with its attendant multiple identities and hybrid cultures means that they have experienced difficulties in fitting in with the demands of the new multicultural Taiwanese national identity. In addition, in line with the increasing concerns of cultural citizenship for diasporas, I explore that the various policies and rights of the Hakkas are considered by the government under the name of ‘Multicultural Taiwan’.

The Hakkas: A Diaspora?

‘Hakka’ is a complex ethnic and cultural phenomenon. Academic analysts have still not identified the origins of the Hakkas with any certainty. The most popular view of the origin of the Hakkas is that they lived in the northern part of mainland China several hundred years ago, having their own language and culture. Because of the
impact of wars and political and economic factors, the Hakkas moved collectively over five times during subsequent centuries. In the Qing Dynasty (AC.1644—1911), they moved to the southern part of mainland China – to Guangdong province, Jiangxi province, and the mountainous area of Fujian province. Since they came from the northern region, the native people viewed them as ‘guests’ or ‘new comers’. That is why they called themselves ‘Hakka’, meaning ‘guests’ in their language. In the seventeenth century, some of the Hakkas continued their journey to the southern part of Asia: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia keeping their special and distinct language, culture and ethnic character. Today, there are a hundred million Hakkas all over the world in the various countries, and they have lived in Taiwan for over 300 years. In these three hundred years, the Hakkas continued their journey across the whole island of Taiwan. Both the traditional cultures they hope to keep, and the new culture stemming from their interaction with other ethnic groups have created complexity in the cultural development of the Taiwanese Hakkas. Based on the long history of migration, the Hakkas is viewed as a ‘diaspora’.

Diaspora, as an old term with a new concept, has attracted increased interest from those involved in ethnic studies, cultural studies, literature, sociology, and anthropology. Diaspora can be viewed as a concept to refer to displaced communities of people who have been dislocated from their native homeland through the movements of migration, immigration, or exile (Braziel and Mannur, 2003, p.1). Today, diaspora is used to describe various well-established communities which have an experience of ‘displacement’ like the Chinese overseas, Americans in exile, Palestinian refugees or the whole African diaspora (Clifford, 1994, Sanfran, 1991). In addition, the attraction of diaspora is related to its status as a transnational social formation since it challenges the hegemony and boundedness of the national-state, and any pure imaginaries of nationhood (Werbner, 2002, p. 120). For example, as Paul
Gilory points out, the diasporic experience shows us that ‘race’, ethnicity, nation and culture are not interchangeable terms, and cultural forms cannot be contained neatly within the structure of the nation-state. This quality can be used to reveal an additional failing of the ‘rigid, pseudobiological’ definition of national cultures, which has been introduced by ethnic absolutism (Gilory, 1987, p.154). Black Britain is a diaspora culture, which does not only derive its culture from Britain, but gets raw material for creative culture from black America and the Caribbean. In other words, black culture is always made and re-made across different nations and culture.

What, then, are the ‘diasporic characteristics’ which the Hakkas share? Williams Safran tries to define ‘diaspora’ as follows:

(1) They, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original ‘center’ to two or more ‘peripheral’ or foreign, regions; (2) they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland…..; (3) they believe that they are not--perhaps cannot be --fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it, (4) they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would eventually return…. ;(5) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to their maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; (6) they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethnocommunal conscious and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship. (Safran, 1991, pp. 83-4)

Using Safran’s ideas about diaspora as a kind of checklist, we can assess whether there could be said to be a Hakka diaspora. Firstly, the Hakka diaspora experienced several major migrations over its history, moving first from the central plains of China and then out from China as migrants to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and countries further afield. However, in spite of their migrations, most Hakkas still maintain a strong nostalgia for their ‘hometown’.

The imagination of the homeland in central China is an essential aspect of Hakka history. The most obvious example of this is that when other ethnic groups defined the Hakkas as ‘barbarian’ during the 1920s and the 1930s in mainland China, the
Hakka researcher, Luo, Xiang-Lin, established a new ‘Hakkaology’ which described the Hakkas as ‘descendants of Chinese nobles’. Luo collected and analyzed many family histories of the Hakkas, and concluded that the Hakkas were the ‘pure’ Han people from the centre of mainland China (Lin, Qing-hong et. al, 2000, pp.13--4). Luo constructed a perfect picture of the history of the Hakkas’ immigrations. His research emphasized that the Hakkas were the most orthodox race among the Han people, and that the Hakkas were the most important ethnic group among the Han people.

Their identity as ‘descendants of Chinese nobles’ had a major influence on the identity of the Hakkas in Taiwan (Yang, Chang-zheng, 1997, p.19). Compared with the Hokkiens, whose ancestors also came from mainland China about three or four hundred years ago, the Hakkas have a stronger identity as ‘Chinese’. According to You, Ying-lung’s research, among the Hokkiens, 35% identify themselves as ‘Taiwanese’, 26% as ‘Chinese’ and 39% as ‘Taiwanese and Chinese’. Among the Hakkas, 26% identify themselves as ‘Taiwanese’, 42% as ‘Chinese’ and 32% as ‘Taiwanese and Chinese’ (You, Ying-long, 1996, p. 55).

However, a new survey from Committee of the Hakkas (2004/11/11), it shows that Chinese identity is declining sharply. Only 5% to 11% of Hakkas still identify themselves as ‘Chinese’, to lie in between mainlanders (15%) and Hokkein (4%) (the Committee of the Hakkas, 2004/11/11).
Secondly, the Hakkas have shared a strong identity as a ‘community’ during their long immigration. Their experiences resulted in a strong sense of identity in relation to their own tradition, language, ancestry and history. The collective identity of the Hakkas has been formed in the process of meeting other ethnic groups (Lin, Qing-hong, 2000, p. 35). Research shows that the Hakkas changed from a ‘cultural group’ to an ‘ethnic group’ because they faced competition and opposition from the native people in Haifeng and Huiyang during the Ming Dynasty (Ibid, p.37). Because the Hakkas were always questioned about their background and origins by other ethnic groups, they had a strong tradition of maintaining their family history. Nicole Constable points out that the key to Hakka identity is not language, shared political interests, shared cultural practices, religion or native place, but it is the way in which these and other elements are invariably tied to Hakka history. In other words, Hakka identity must be viewed as having been constructed through the telling and retelling of history (Constable, 1994, p. 76).

In addition, the Hakkas have always had the strong feeling of being ‘guests’ (as is their name) or ‘other’ in the various places. The case of Taiwan also tells the same story. Hakka competition with Hokkien migrants from Fujian province for land and resources during the early centuries of Taiwan settlement influenced to a certain degree the Hakka definition of themselves. During the 17th and 18th centuries, the Hakka and Hokkien utilized ‘primordial attachments’ based on bloodline, language, hometown, customs and religion to construct distinct ethnic identities. To further solidify their separateness, both groups made degrading the other a centerpiece of their ethnic strategy and numerous conflicts followed, founded in the ‘logic of the stigma’ (Xu, Wen-xiong, 2003, p.153).
However, the Hakka faced a comparatively more difficult situation, as their population was significantly smaller than that of the Hokkien. Weak Qing sovereignty over Taiwan during the 18th and 19th centuries forced Hakkas to rely on their own initiative to survive. During the Qing Dynasty, personal grudges and land or water access quarrels caused 51 significant conflicts between Hakkas and Hokkiens (Ibid: 165). Tensions between the two made Hakkas feel like a true minority group in Taiwan.

In the age of Japanese ruling, in addition to the language-training program, thousands of public schools were open. Public schooling gradually created a sense of Taiwanese identity. Children of Hakka, Hokkiens, and aboriginal decent mingled in schools and were subjected to a common discipline and learning. They might speak separate ethnic languages at home, and lived in separate communities, but their common means of communication was Japanese (Kiang, 1992).

From 1949, the KMT government, which was controlled by the mainlanders, practiced a strong cultural policy of ‘sinolisation’. Hakka culture and language were also suppressed under KMT rule. For example, Tsai-cha-shi, traditional Hakka theatre, which was quite vigorous prior to the 1950s, saw the KMT government impose limits on its performance due to political and social concerns. Many Tsai-cha-shi theatres closed throughout the 1970s. Its negative effects on Hakka culture, including the loss of qualified actors and musicians as well as an appreciative audience, continue to be felt even at the present time (Interview with Zheng, Rong-xing).

It is important to understand the diasporic experience of the Hakkas. The Hakkas had several long-term migrations, but insisted on keeping their traditional life, culture, language and ethnic identity. They had to reconstruct themselves from the viewpoint of another native ethnicity in order to survive in the new homeland whilst simultaneously maintaining a strong sense of their ancestral homeland—mainland
China. As a result, the forms of Hakka culture and identity are very diverse and plentiful. As a ‘diaspora’, the Hakkas represent some of the problems inherent in the construction of Taiwanese national identity. The interaction between the Hakkas and the other various national identities are always complex and relative. This issue influences the reconstruction of a new Hakka identity in Taiwan based on the complexity of national identity.

**The Hakkas and National Identity**

The traditional Hakka identity is constructed through the image of ‘the descendants of the Chinese Nobles’. The emphasis on a common history also stresses the close relationship between the Hakkas and mainland China because all Hakkas came from there (Martin, 1998, p. 225). Thus the Hakkas are viewed as an ethnic group with a strong link to China but not Taiwan. Hence, in the age of Chinese nationalism, the traditional Hakka discourse – ‘the descendants of Chinese Nobles’ -- was not an advantage to the Hakkas, since all ethnic groups were forced to be Chinese, including Taiwanese aborigines. The Hakkas’ culture and language were lost in the assimilation policy, as was also the case with other ethnic groups such as the aborigines and the Hokkiens. But after the increase in Taiwanese consciousness, dominated by the Hokkiens, the Hakkas were criticized for ‘not identifying with Taiwan’ (Xiao, Xin-huang, 2000). While the Hokkiens, whose ancestors also came from the southern part of China, have given up their nostalgia for China and become ‘Taiwanese’, the Hakkas are still confused about whether they should become Taiwanese or not.

However, the localization movements of the 1970s and the aboriginal movements of the 1980s stimulated the Hakkas to reflect on their loss of culture, tradition and language over the previous 40 years. Just as the Hokkiens used the
localization movement to demand their cultural rights and the aborigines used the aboriginal movement to resist the assimilation policy, the Hakkas began to develop their own movement in the 1980s in an attempt to reconstruct their identity in Taiwan. In 1988, some young Hakkas set up the magazine *The Hakka Storm* and began to fight for their rights. In the first issue, they pointed out that:

> We find that the language has been disappearing gradually; maybe after several years our language will disappear, and the Hakka culture will disappear as well, and then the Hakkas will break down in the future. … Thus, we have to stand upon the base of 'the Humanity of the Hakka' to promote Hakka consciousness, to improve the cohesion of the Hakkas, to unify the power of the Hakkas, and to fight for the common interest of the Hakkas. Finally, we have to promote the status of the Hakkas in the political, economic, social and cultural fields, so that the Hakkas can play a more active role in democratic and multicultural society (*The Hakka Storm*, 1987, p.1).

At the same time, the Hakkas began to diminish their mainland China identity. The Hakkas have historically been stigmatized as ‘Yi-min’, a term that defines them as always supporting the ruler or party in power. As the Hakka social movement has grown, they have faced a similar dilemma regarding whether to choose China or Taiwan. Many Hakkas are of the mind that they should become involved in the ongoing process of democratization and localization in order to eventually establish a proper role for their ethnic group in Taiwan (Yang, Chang-zheng, 1997, p26). Some Hakka researchers also point out that the Hakka movement is related to democratic movement and that Hakkas should demand rights, political resources and an equitable status through this process. In other words, rather than being isolated from this process, they need to ‘participate in the construction of a common Taiwanese consciousness, set up democratic political views, and improve its links to localization’ (Xiao, Xin-huang, 2001, p 625). In the end, the Hakkas hope to be one of the ‘masters’, not a marginalized minority (Lee, Qiao, 1998, pp.29–30). Therefore, Taiwan’s democratic movement provides three different stimuli for Hakkas to fashion
a Taiwanese identity. Firstly, it improves linkages between Hakkas and localization movements; secondly, it allows Hakkas to take more initiative in ethnic relationships; and thirdly, it pushes the Hakkas to accept a new national identity (ibid, p. 26).

To this end, the Hakka Affairs Public Association (HAPA) created a new discourse for the Hakkas under the title ‘the New Hakkas’ (1998). A poem by the first president of the HAPA called ‘the New Hakkas’ states:

Do not speak, the Hakkas were very great before,
Do not speak, the Hakkas were so outstanding before,
We are the new Hakkas now.
We had endless pains and difficulty, across mountains and sea to Taiwan.
We were in tears and blood, opened up the forests and trees to set up home.
We are the new Hakkas now.
Do not say this land is poor, do not say this land is barren.
Our hopes are here now.
We will create the new spirit of the Hakka. We will create the glory of the Hakka.
We are the new Hakkas now’ (Zhong, Zhao-Zheng, 1998, p 83).

In this poem, Zhong shows us the meaning of ‘the new Hakkas’. First, the new Hakkas have to shake off the old traditional construction of the Hakka, so that they do not ‘speak of the past’ anymore. Furthermore, he shifts the focus of the Hakka identity from mainland China to Taiwan, and tries to search for a common experience in Taiwan. No matter how poor this land is, Taiwan is the only hope for the new Hakkas.

Another discourse of the ‘Taiwanese Hakkas’, which was highlighted by the ‘Taiwanese Hakka Camp’, seeks to strengthen the relationship between the Hakkas and Taiwan. The Camp articulated a new concept -- the ‘Taiwanese Hakkas’ -- to announce the reconstruction of ‘local ethnicity’ in Taiwan. For the Camp, emphasis on the ‘the descendants of the Chinese nobles’ in traditional Hakka discourse is far removed from the reality of Taiwanese society. They see themselves as ‘Taiwanese Hakkas’ but not ‘Hakkas in Taiwan’.

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Through the shift from ‘the traditional Hakkas’ to ‘the new Hakkas’ to the ‘Taiwanese Hakka’, the Hakkas have tried to reconstruct their ethnic identity in order to gain a position in the new national discourse of multicultural Taiwan. However, the diasporic characteristics of the Hakkas have made this reconstruction difficult. Diasporic subjects are marked by hybridity and heterogeneity--cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and national. This hybridity opens diasporic subjectivity to a liminal, dialogic space wherein identity is negotiated (Braziel and Mannur, 2003, p.5). The problem of national identity is increasing unstable, uncertain and complex.

The Diversity of the Hakka Identity

What is ‘Hakka’ and what is Hakka identity? Is Hakka a true ethnic group or only a sub-cultural within a larger ethnic grouping? The answers to these questions remain open to debate. Differing from Luo, Chen, Zhi-ping does not believe that Hakkas have a bloodline that differs significantly from other groups in Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangxi. He sees the blood relationships among these groups to be mingling and mixing (Chen, Zhi-ping, 1998,p.147).

Even so, how have the Hakkas come to see themselves as a distinct ethnic group? It is related to how one defines ‘ethnicity’ – based on language, culture, a common history, or some other factor or combination of factors. Chen, Zhi-ping wrote:

Ethnic groups are formed out of common social and cultural characters and values. Ethnic groups separate themselves subjectively from others and, when facing conflicts with others, they will consolidate their unity to overcome difficulty …Such groups will enjoy strong influence in society (Ibid,p. 155).

Similarly, Leong, Sow-Theng argues that Hakkas, Cantonese, Hokkiens and other southeastern Chinese socio-linguistic groups that share a common culture and
traditions, take on the character of ethnic groups only in certain contact situations. 

According to Leong:

A cultural group ‘becomes’ ethnic only when, in competition with another, these shared markers are consciously chosen to promote solidarity and mobilization, with a view to enhancing the group’s share of societal resources or simply minimizing the threats to its survival (Leong, Sow-Theng, 1997,p.14)

Therefore, the identity of Taiwanese Hakka is fluid and complex due to some different issues, such as the conflict of national identity, the blur of ethnic boundaries and the changing political situation. Their identity remains diverse and multiple, and is often broader than the national identity. It ranges from the experience of local Hakka villages to traditional Chinese Hakka, and from the identity of Liutui and Taoyuan/Hsinchu/Miaoli (the Hakka villages) to ‘pan-Hakka consciousness’, as in ‘the new Hakka’ and the concept of Taiwanese Hakka. Shared ancestors, language, history, culture, homeland, personal experience, and national identity are all major influences on how the Hakka ‘imagine’ or ‘invent’ their ethnicity.

**Local identity**

Local identity for the Hakka comes from experience in small Hakka towns or the bigger Hakka villages, such as Taoyuan/Hsinchu/Miaoli or Liutui. However, the most common situation is where the people identify themselves as Hakka from their hometowns. For example, the people of Meinong have a very strong identity as Hakka because of the anti-reservoir movement. The experience of this movement made the people of Meinong feel that ‘we are the Hakka’. Among the different Hakka villages, there is evidence of considerable cultural variation. Chen, Ban argues that because of this it is difficult to set up a ‘pan-Hakka consciousness’ in Taiwan. There is no social institution to support this. Thus ‘pan-Hakka consciousness’ will become ‘vacuous’ in the future. Chen thinks that the Hakka movement needs to
combine with the communal movement in order to provide the space and material to develop the Hakka identity (Chen, Ban, 2001, interview).

Language identity

Because the Hakkas, the Hokkiens and the mainlanders are all Han people, they look quite similar in appearance. Thus, the ability to speak the Hakka language is a key factor in recognising the Hakka ethnic status. Many people construct their identity from language: ‘you are Hakka, so you have to speak the Hakka language’ is the guiding principle. If the Hakkas meet someone who can speak the same language, they feel very close to them, even if they come from different areas (Zhong, Tie-ming, 1998, p. 47).

Identity based on kinship or blood relationship

Many new generations of Hakkas were born in the big cities and have consequently had no opportunity to make contact with and understand the Hakka culture or learn the Hakka language. But their parents are Hakkas, so they identify themselves as Hakkas (Lin, Xiao-fang, 2001, interview). An increase in marriage across ethnic boundaries also makes it more difficult to define who a Hakka is. If a Hakka marries a Hokkien, what identity do their children have? (Yang, Chang-zheng, 2001, interview).

In addition, the identity of kinship or blood relationship emphasises common ancestry, which is therefore close to the sense of Chinese Hakka or international Hakka identity. Thus the Hakkas feel confused about the link between their ethnic identity and national identity. However, an identity based on kinship and blood relationship is still important in Taiwan.

The ‘pan-Hakka consciousness’ of Taiwan

Under the impact of the localisation movement, many Hakkas are aware of the need for their own distinctive culture. Even though there are many different Hakka
The Identity of Chinese Hakka and International Hakka

The history of family and ancestors plays an important role in Hakka culture. Since their ancestors came from mainland China, the Hakkas have a stronger identity with, and memory of, China than do the Hokkiens, whose ancestors also came from mainland China. At the same time, the Hakkas also have a strong identity with their 'members', who share the same language and blood relationship in various countries across the world. Luo’s research also strengthened the idea of a ‘common imagination’ of the Hakkas across national boundaries: the Hakkas may have lived in mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia, but they have the same ancestors, share the same blood, and speak the same language. This ‘international’ dimension is another important characteristic of the traditional Hakka identity.

Multiple or multi-ethnic Hakka identity

Because of the prevalence of marriages between different ethnic groups, some new generations of Hakkas, who live away from the Hakka villages, have forgotten their ethnicity or have become assimilated by the Hokkiens. They are called ‘the Hokkien-Hakkas’. On the other hand, there are some Hokkiens who live in the Hakka villages and are assimilated by the Hakkas. These are called ‘the Hakka-Hokkiens’ (Interview with Wu, Ming-Zhong, 2001). A new research by Qio, Yan-Guang shows that most Hokkiens also have a blood relationship with the Hakkas in Taiwan (Qiu,
Yan-Qui and Wu, Zhong-Jie, 2001, pp.80-2). This discussion is similar to the researches by Chen, Zhi-ping and Leong, Sow-Theng in mainland China. All this testifies to the enormous complexity of Hakka identity.

In fact, the Hakka phenomenon presents an interesting case for multicultural Taiwan since the Hakka are close to the idea of a postmodernist ‘hybridity’. Hybridity works simultaneously in two ways: organically by hegemonising - creating new space, structure, scenes; and intentionally by diasporising, intervening as a form of subversion, translation and transformation. The Hakkas' experience involves processes of merging and of the dialogisation of ethnic and cultural differences set critically against each other. They operate dialogically together, in a double-voiced, hybridised form of cultural politics. In addition, as Robert J.C. Young notes, hybridity ‘makes differences into sameness, and sameness into difference, but in a way that makes the same no longer the same, the different no longer simply different’ (1995, p. 26). Furthermore, it suggests the impossibility of essentialism, but denotes a fusion and describes a dialectical articulation (Ibid, p. 27).

The discourse of ‘multicultural Taiwan’ and the ‘Four Ethnic Groups’ seeks to strengthen a new national identity based on the various ethnic identities. But the experience of the Hakka identity highlights the difficulties of reconstructing a homogeneous, unified identity in Taiwan. It also raises fundamental questions about the nature of both collective and national identity in ‘multicultural Taiwan’.

**Hakka policy, Identity and Citizenship**

However, we need to consider the influence of ‘Multicultural Taiwan’ from the views of policy and citizenship. Citizenship is viewed as important issue. Firstly, citizenship is related to national identity. For example, according to J. Habermas, citizenship is ‘political membership’. It is only recently that the concept has been
expanded to cover the status of citizens defined in terms of civil rights. In addition, citizenship has as its reference point the problem of societal self-organization and at its core the political rights of participation and communication. The status of citizen is constituted above all by those democratic rights to which the individual can reflexively lay claim in order to alter this material legal status (Habermas, 1992, p.5).

From the perspective of citizenship, Habermas reinforces the argument that national identity should be based on civil rights and democratic system, but not ethnic or cultural origins. Habermas points out:

Examples of multicultural societies like Switzerland and the United States demonstrate that a political culture in the seedbed of which constitutional principles are rooted by no means has to be based on all citizens sharing the same language or the same ethnic and cultural origins. Rather, the political culture must serve as the common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a multicultural society. In a future Federal Republic of European States, the same legal principles would also have to be interpreted from the vantage point of different national traditions and histories….It must be connected with the overlapping consensus of a common, supranationally shared political culture of the European Community. Particularist anchoring of this sort would in no way impair the universalist meaning of popular sovereignty and human rights(Ibid, p.7).

Secondly, the concept of ‘citizenship’ is expanding, and, its expansion leads to some new rights for people. As Stuart Hall and David Held explain in their discussion of the new politics of citizenship in the 1990s, the key innovation has been an expansion of the definition of citizenship and the base upon which rights are demanded:

A contemporary ‘politics of citizenship’ must take into account the role which the social movements have played in expanding the claims to rights and entitlements to new areas. It must address not only issues of class and inequality, but also questions of membership posed by feminism, the black and ethnic movements, ecology and vulnerable minorities, like children (Hall and Held, 1990, p. 176).

In addition, the contemporary practice of citizenship has become decoupled from
belonging to the national collective (Soyal, 2000, p. 4). Although citizenship is still seen as an exclusionary identity denoting loyalty to a singular national collectivity, in reality people bear multiple collective loyalties and quite often multiple formal citizenships (Werbner, 2002, p.126). Many immigrants, such as Turkish or Pakistani, make claims to their identity and rights in the public sphere with the universalistic language of 'human rights' to justify themselves, even without nationality (Soyal, 2000). In the research of diaspora, there is increasing importance placed on the development of making and enacting citizenship.

The recent creation of a Hakka policy and the expansion of citizenship provide new approaches to absorb Hakka into a ‘Multicultural Taiwan’. The various discussions revolving around citizenship show the close relationships that connect national identity, diaspora and citizenship. The Hakka diaspora also fits into these discussions. Firstly, the creation of a Hakka policy influences the Hakka in Taiwan to form, choose and express their identities. The implementation of Hakka policy then expands the collective rights of the Hakka. The expansion of Hakka citizenship is viewed as the main medium through which Hakka are being involved in the discourse of ‘Multicultural Taiwan’. Hakka policy, multicultural identity and citizenship have formed a close connection.

The Creation of Hakka Policy

Hakka policy has developed only recently. Before the 1988 movement of ‘Returning My Mother Language to Me’, the Hakka, just like other ‘invisible’ people in Taiwan, did not receive much support from the government. However, with the raising of Hakka consciousness and the Hakka movement, and the development of Hakkaology, Hakka issues have become public matters in Taiwanese society. The KMT government and the other political parties are forced to provide a ‘Hakka
policy’ in order to win the vote of the Hakkas at elections. Finally, ‘Hakka policy’ has become public policy in the government. The main Hakka policies are as following:

**The Promotion of Hakka Culture:**

Since 1995, the Hakka Cultural Festival has been held every year in Taipei and is becoming one of the main Hakka policies. Many other cities and counties also hold a Hakka Cultural Festival to promote the cultural development of the Hakkas. These festivals have several functions. For example, the Hakka Cultural Festival can combine Hakka culture and modern life, and thus helps to add new cultural elements to the traditional Hakka culture. At the same time, people can learn about the traditional Hakka culture through modern cultural activity (Dai, Biao-chu, 1998, pp. 161-2). In addition, for the young generation of Hakkas who were born in Taipei, the Hakka Cultural Festival helps them to understand ‘what the Hakka is’ (Lin, Xiao-fang, 2001, interview).

In 1997, the Committee of Cultural Affairs (CCA) began to sponsor some media output by minority groups, and in so doing it claimed to be developing and protecting the Hakka and aboriginal cultures (CCA, 1997). Following on from this, the Committee of the Hakkas (CH, established from 2000) has outlined some policies to improve cultural participation. In ‘The Plan to Promote the Hakka Culture in Six Years’ (2002a) these measures include: helping to set up Hakka cultural workshops and artist villages; setting up Hakka cultural centres to help the local governments and communities to promote Hakka culture; and reconstructing Hakka cultural life by improving Hakka cultural activities, recording Hakka culture life, and creating the Hakka’s traditional culture (CH, 2002a, pp. 6--12).

**The Development of the Hakka Language**

There is considerable research to show that the language rights of the Hakkas are restricted. For example, the proportion of people who can speak the Hakka language
is only 3% in Taipei City, much less than the Hakka population, which is about 12% of the total (Huang, Xuan-fan, 1995, p.160); even so, about 22.4-26.4% of the Hakkas’ young generation have lost their mother language (Ibid, p. 146). For many Hakkas the preservation of the Hakka language is the most important mission.

Therefore, the teaching of the Hakka language is an important issue. The Ministry of Education practices ‘the Education of the Mother Language’. In primary schools the students have to learn this mother language for two hours every week. In the Hakka villages the schools teach the Hakka language as the mother language. In order to help the Ministry of Education, the Committee of the Hakkas will set up a group to train Hakka teachers, to improve the Hakka language as a written language, to edit Hakka textbooks, and to carry out research into the Hakka language. In addition, they will provide sponsorship to kindergartens to teach Hakkas, and to increase the base for the education of the mother language.

In addition, when the policy of ‘National Language’ was implemented, the Hokkien, Hakka and aboriginal languages were viewed as ‘family languages’ which could not be used in public. Therefore, the space for the development of the Hakka language is narrow, because not many people want to learn a ‘family language’. The Committee of the Hakkas hopes to promote the Hakka language as a public language, thus increasing people’s motivation to learn it. The beginning of the new policy will involve providing public announcements in the Hakka language, translations in the Hakka language at public meetings, and Hakka language services in government. The Committee of the Hakkas has urged ‘the service of the Hakka language in administrative institutions’(CH, 2002a).

**The Establishment of Hakka TV**

Prior to the implementation of the policy, The Hakkas did not have enough language rights, in particular in the mass media. Most of the Hakkas could not
listen to their language on the radio. In order to respond to the demands of the Hakkas, the Bureau of Information abolished the limitations on the use of dialects in TV programmes and permitted the establishment of the Formosa Hakka Radio. In addition, it began to sponsor productions of Hakka programmes on the radio and TV.\(^9\)

In particular, Hakka TV was established in July 2003. As ‘the Persuasive Letter of Hakka TV’ said:

TV is an important element of cultural communication, a main power to construct social and cultural life, and a key factor in forming public opinion….To set up a Hakka channel is to set up a centre to exchange Hakka culture and language. On the one hand, Hakka TV can increase understanding of Hakka language and culture, while on the other hand, it can help return Hakka culture to the public sphere, reinforce a general use of the language, rebuild identity, and then, enrich the meaning of a ‘Multicultural Taiwan’ (the Persuasive Letter of Hakka TV, 2003).

**The Hakkas and Community Renaissance**

Like other social movements, the Hakka movements turned into communal movements from the mid-1990s. Hakka communal movements have led to many achievements, such as those in Liutu, Meinong, and Beipu.

Community Renaissance has become a vitally important part of Hakka cultural policy. This is because, first of all, it emphasizes the connection with the land and localization, which increases the various Hakka cultural differences based on regions. Thus the northern Hakkas are different from the southern Hakkas. On a smaller scale the Bei-pu Hakkas are distinct from other Hakkas. Hakka culture has accordingly become more heterogeneous – like a mosaic culture -- under the influence of Community Renaissance. In addition, Community Renaissance is constructed on the basis of everyday life. Thus it provides a way to ‘renew’ Hakka culture in modern society. For example, the life-experience of Meinong has created a modern Hakka rock group -- Giao-gong Music Band.

These various Hakka policies influence the identities of the Hakkas. The first
influence is related to new national identity. Before that, the Committee of Aboriginal Affairs was set up to strengthen the protection of aboriginal rights, it was also the first step by the government to establish Taiwan as a multicultural democratic country. Afterwards, the establishment of the Committee of the Hakkas and the Hakka policy are viewed as the second step forward towards a multicultural democratic country (The Preparatory Meeting of the Committee of the Hakkas, 2001, p.10). In other words, Hakka culture was added to a new national culture, which was constructed by the ‘Four Ethnic Groups’; and as a result, a new national discourse – ‘multicultural democratic Taiwan’ – was instituted. Furthermore, Hakka culture will strengthen Taiwan’s multiculturalism, e.g. in terms of the diversity of language, different views of Taiwanese history, and more cultural differences in the public sphere.

In addition, the practice of Hakka policy provides more material to create a distinct identity. For example, Hakka cultural activities help the new generation to understand what Hakka culture is and find material with which to further define their ethnic identity in the real world. As one young interviewee points out, ‘we cannot share Hakka identity without Hakka music, literature or films to support it. Without these cultural productions, the term “identity” is empty’ (Wu, Ming-zhong, 2001, interview).

Community Renaissance is viewed as an important factor to support Hakka development for the same reason. Hakka language and traditional culture can be improved only in Hakka villages. The experiences of the Meinong, Beipu and Jiuzantou communities all demonstrate potential approaches to instil the influence of local identity in order to maintain Hakka identity.

The Expansion of Citizenship in Taiwanese Hakkas

The new collective rights of the Hakkas should be protected by the Hakka policy
under the name of ‘Multicultural Taiwan’. In particular, cultural rights of the Hakkas were not previously included in the status of citizenship. Some cultural rights, like the right to cultural identity, the right to participate in one’s own culture, the right to be represented and language rights, were ignored by the government. With the development of Hakka collective rights, the concept of citizenship will be expanded.10

The right to cultural identity

With the development of the Hakka movement and the creation of a ‘Multicultural Taiwan’, Taiwanese Hakkas have been able to break away from traditional stigmas and improve their own cultural identity. In particular, the reevaluation of Hakka history is helpful to their implementation of ‘the right to cultural identity’.

Powerful groups always control the writing of history. Similarly, the writing of Taiwanese history was dominated by the Hokkiens in the earlier stages and by the mainlanders after 1949. For example, the two main books on Taiwanese history, *Taiwan's General History* (taiwan tong shi) by Lian, Heng, and *Four Hundred Years of Taiwanese History* (taiwan sibainian shi) by Shi, Ming, are written by Hokkiens. Thus, the Hakkas are described as 'others' and as an 'accessory' of the dominated groups during periods of ethnic conflicts between the Hakkas and the Hokkiens.11 These views have led to a ‘stigma’ being attached to the Hakkas, and also to continuing misunderstandings between the Hokkiens and the Hakkas. Until the present age, most county histories, like those of Taoyuan/Hsinchu/Miaoli, where the Hakkas are in the majority, were written by Hokkiens. Recently, in response to this situation, Hakkas have sought to produce a new version of their history.

In 1997 and 1998, Taipei city and Taiwan Province began to sponsor the writing of Hakka history. The Chief of the Preparatory Committee, Xu, Zheng-Quang, believes that the Hakkas have to construct their own views of history if they are to have their own identity and self-confidence(Interview with Xu, Zheng-Quang). The
Committee of the Hakkas is preparing to edit *Important Historical Events of the Hakka* and other Hakka historical works.

In 1998, the Department of Cultural Affairs of Taiwan Province combined Community Renaissance and local historical research to initiate the plan: ‘we come to write the history of the village’. This plan sought to mobilize the people of villages to write their own history in different ways, e.g. through oral history, the discovery of landmarks in villages, the construction of village museums, and community theatre (Chen, Ban, 2001).

Most Hakkas feel anxious because their ethnic status is excluded from official history. Thus in the past they have preferred to construct their status in terms of ‘the Nobles of the Han people’ through the invention of tradition. However, the history written by the common people seeks to get in touch more closely with the real world of everyday life. In offering an alternative to traditional official history or Chinese nationalism in history, the aim is to provide a ‘folk’ way to discuss history.

*The Rights to participate in cultural life*

The major factors which have led to the lack of participation in Hakka culture are related to the role of mass media. The mass media are an important channel through which people can reach and participate in cultural life by sharing and experiencing many different arts and cultures.12

Thus the problems that the Hakkas have had in accessing the mass media is another important policy concern for the Committee of the Hakkas. The Committee states that its policy is to train the Hakkas to produce their own programmes (including news programmes), to cooperate with other media to produce Hakka programmes, and to support the establishment of a national Hakka radio service (CH, 2002b, p.11). In addition, the Committee of the Hakkas will sponsor the TV companies to produce 14
hours of Hakka programmes each week; to provide Hakka programmes to the various TV companies; to dub famous films into the Hakka language; and to sponsor the establishment of Hakka radio and Hakka channels (Ibid, pp. 5-6).

Whether or not Hakka TV can help Hakkas increase their access to cultural life is a question explored by many researchers. According to Zhong, Rong-Fu, the influence of Hakka TV is quite limited. Most of the interviewees in his research seldom watch Hakka TV (84.4%), and they do not speak the Hakka language any more than they did prior to the establishment of Hakka TV. Only five percent of interviewees felt Hakka TV would benefit the development of Hakka culture and language, while an overwhelming eighty percent felt it would not (Zhong, Rong-Fu, 2003).

However, looking at the influence of Hakka TV from the perspective of its viewing audience, we find that around forty-two percent are Hakka language users and over half are defined as elderly and living outside of metropolitan areas (Lee, Young-De, 2003). Such results demonstrate that Hakka TV indeed does service a certain segment of the population that has been ignored by the mainstream media. This audience cannot speak Mandarin, which denies them access to mass media programming.

In general, while Hakka TV gives elderly Hakkas access to the mass media, it falls well short of its stated objective of delivering to the Hakkas ‘the right to participate in cultural life’.

**The Rights to Representation of the Hakkas:**

The representation of the Hakkas has always been very limited. We can identify several problems. The first is that of ‘invisibility’. The Taiwanese mainstream mass media have simply neglected Hakka issues. The second problem is that most of the Hakka news in the mainstream media is focused on the annual ‘I-Min’ festival and
traditional rites. The general audience believes that the Hakkas are generally ‘unkempt and superstitious’ (Zhong, Hao-Ru, 2003).

Furthermore, the mass media tends to exacerbate this misrepresentation of Hakkas and leads to stigmatisation. For example, the role of ‘Dong, Yue-hua’ in the late 1990s illustrates the bitter experience of Hakka representation in the mass media. It demonstrates that there are few genuinely multicultural attitudes in the Taiwanese mass media. Moreover, the mass media provide a misleading image of the Hakka and ‘look down’ on other ethnic cultures. Therefore, the Hakkas seek to gain more opportunities to represent their ethnic group in the future, thereby regaining their ethnic confidence.

To sum up, the Hakka diaspora with its hybrid cultures and multiple identities is a challenge to the construction of a homogeneous national culture. However, as citizenship is viewed as the main element of national identity, it provides new material with which to create a new Hakka identity.

The special experience of Taiwanese Hakkas

Taiwanese Hakkas have developed their identity with close links to democratization, national identity, Hakka policy and citizenship. Similarly, the Hakkas in Hong Kong or Southeast Asia have practised their cultural choices and strategies based on their specific needs under distinct political power and economic limitations (Pong, 1998, p. 1254). Furthermore, ethnic cultural identity should be a process that earns recognition for their special status in order to gain interests and power and to survive as a distinct ethnic group (Ibid, p. 1260). Therefore, Hakkas present diverse identities and cultures in both different areas and at different historical times.

Comparing mainland Chinese Hakkas and Taiwanese Hakkas, we find that Chinese Hakkas are characterized by living in special regions and belonging to
distinct patriarchal clans. Contrasting this, Taiwanese Hakkas have largely integrated with the various regional cultures from Mainland China (such as Szshian, Dapu, and Hailu) and represent a ‘trans-Hakka cultural identity’. Taiwanese Hakkas possess regional and cultural diversity (Chen, Ban, 2003).

Take Hong Kong for example, Yang Tsung-Rung points out that Hong Kong has a large Hakka population, strong Hakka organizations, and an advantageous position in academia. However, their ethnic identity is weak. Yang uses two indexes to define the lack of Hakka identity in Hong Kong. Firstly, the Hakka language is quickly being lost and, secondly, the Hakka identity is not included within the structure of the Hong Kong identity (Yang, Tsung-Rung, 2002).

Based on these two points, we can identify some of the basic similarities and differences between Taiwanese and Hong Kong Hakkas. These two groups share similar challenges, including language use restrictions, disadvantageous educational policies and urbanization, that have lead to the loss of Hakka language users. However, the two groups have recently taken different paths of development. Taiwanese Hakkas have strived for their language by social activism since 1988, while Hong Kong Hakkas have chosen to remain silent. This phenomenon is related to the second index. Hakka identity has been absent from the construct of Hong Kong identity since the 1960s, with most Hakka organizations there identifying only with a ‘global Hakka’, not ‘local Hong Kong Hakka’, identity (Yang, Tsung-Rung, 2002). On the other hand, Taiwanese Hakkas are searching for ‘localization’ in Taiwan and are concerned with gaining status within a ‘Multicultural Taiwan’ to protect their rights.

Another case is related to the development of Hakkas in Southeast Asia, where Hakka identity is not as distinctive as ‘Chinese identity’. Researchers argue that the Hakka diaspora has faced different identity choices in adapting to their new
environments. In Mainland China, the Hakkas have formed their identity based on the differences between ‘Hakka’ and other minority groups. Therefore, the ‘Hakka’ identity remains an important factor there. However, the Hakkas in Southeast Asia have chosen to adopt a ‘Chinese identity’ in order to cooperate with other ethnic groups, such as the Hokkiens or Cantonese and to differentiate themselves from the Thai, Malays or Indians. For example, the Hakkas in Malaysia have weaker Hakka identity and more social alliances across regions and languages. Furthermore, they share a strong ‘national identity’, i.e., a Chinese rather than ethnic identity, that transcends national boundaries. (Liu, Hong, 2000, p.394)

This also reflects the similar difficulties that the Hakka diaspora has faced in choosing its identity through the various historical periods in Taiwan. In constructing a ‘Multicultural Taiwan’, Hakkas must highlight their ethnic identity to demand more political, economic and cultural rights.

**Conclusion:**

The Hakkas constitute a diaspora based on their experiences of long immigration, nostalgia for mainland China, multiple identities and hybrid cultures. The Hakkas had several long-term migrations during which they insisted on keeping their traditional life, culture, language and ethnic identity. It is inevitable, however, that their traditional cultures have been diluted and influenced by their relations with other ethnic groups with whom they have come into contact. They had to reconstruct themselves from the viewpoint of another native ethnicity in order to survive in the new homeland while simultaneously attempting to maintain a strong identity with their ancestral homeland in mainland China.

As the Hakka as a group may be seen to exhibit the characteristics of a diaspora, tensions exist between the Hakka identity and the construction of Taiwanese national
identity. Firstly, some of the Hakka identities, such as those of the ‘Chinese Hakka’ and the ‘International Hakka’ are beyond the national boundaries which the discourse of a ‘Multicultural Taiwan’ tries to set up. The case of the Hakkas also illustrates the difficulty of constructing a homogenous, unified identity, whether in national or ethnic terms, in Taiwan today. The hybrid Hakka culture and the multiple Hakka identities challenge the discourse of ‘multicultural Taiwan’ and that of the ‘Four Ethnic Groups’. In other words, this hybridity challenges the nature of collective identity and national identity itself. It shows how hard it is to define the various ethnic cultures for the discourse of ‘Multicultural Taiwan’ based on ‘Four Ethnic Groups’.

With the development of multiculturalism and universal human rights, diasporas have more legitimacy to make claims for cultural identity and group rights. Under the name of ‘Multicultural Taiwan’, many Hakka cultural policies have been implemented to improve the cultural citizenship of the Hakkas, in particular the establishment of the Committee of the Hakkas. The connections between ‘Multicultural Taiwan’, Hakka policy, and the expansion of citizenship provide new material for Hakka identities. However, only time will tell what effect these changes in cultural policy will have on Hakka culture in the future.

We can see that diaspora is a powerful challenge to the hegemony and boundedness of the nation-state and any pure imaginary of nationhood. In Taiwan, the government tries to utilize the discourse of ‘Multicultural Taiwan’ based on the homogeneity of ethnic cultures to reconstruct a new national identity but, as we have seen, still faces many challenges from diaspora. The Hakka diaspora not only challenges a pure imaginary of nationhood—‘Multicultural Taiwan’, but also a pure imaginary of ethnicity—‘the Hakkas’. As is the case with other diasporas, the Hakkas introduce more hybridity, heterogeneity, diversity, dynamics and negotiated identity into Taiwanese society.
The List of Interviewees and Dates

Government

Xu, Zheng-Guang
(Chief of Preparatory Committee of the Hakkas, 2000-2002) (04/03/2001)

Yuang, Zhang-Zen
(Adviser of Committee of the Hakkas, 2002--2004)
(26/02/2001) and (03/05/2002)

Non-Government

Chen, ban
(Hakka movement, community worker)
(25/02/2001) and (29/06/2001)

Zhong, Tie-Min, (writer)
(02/03/2001)

Zheng, Rong-Xing (Hakka traditional drama)
(05/03/2001)

Zeng, Cai-Jin (historian)
(02/03/2001)

Zeng, Nian-Yu (community worker)
(06/06/2001)

Wu, Ming-Zhong (Community worker)
(09/06/2001)
Wen, Chong-Liang (community worker)
(20/06/2001)

Lin, Xiao-Fang (photographer)
(20/06/2001)

Huang, Zi-Yai (Hakka Radio)
(07/06/2001)

Gu, Xiu-Ru and Chen, Yong-Tao (musicians)
(01/03/2001)

Gu, Xiu-Fei (Hakka cultural Committee)
(21/02/2001)

Huang, Quan-Bo (community worker)
(16/06/2001)
Footnotes:

1 Taiwanese society is struggling with two problems. One is the lack of a common national identity. The clash between Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity has led to other conflicts within the whole society. The other problem is related to inequality among the various cultural communities, which has created a crisis in political legitimacy and social justice. In response to these challenges multicultur alism has become an important influence in Taiwan’s cultural policy, and 'multicultural Taiwan' is constructed as a new national identity. In 1997, the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC, the name of government in Taiwan) claims that ROC recognizes and supports multi-cultures with the amendment of the Tenth Article. In 2001, President Chen, Shu-ban announced that 'ROC is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country. Multiculturalism is the basic national policy' (the Presidential Palace, 11th November 2001).

2 'Cultural group' means that the members of the group share the same ‘objective’ characteristics, while the members of an ‘ethnic group’ share a ‘subjective’ identity.

3 The Hokkiens make up the largest ethnic group in Taiwan, with about 65% of the whole population, and the Hakka are the second largest, with about 15%. The mainlanders make up about 12% and the Taiwanese aborigines are about 3%. Compared with the other ethnic groups, the Hakka have a similar economic and political status to the Hokkiens, and a higher status than that of Taiwanese aborigines. At the same time, their population is larger than that of mainlanders. Thus some people wonder why the Hakkas are often viewed as a ‘minority’. However, the Hokkiens enjoy the advantages of their large population, and the mainlanders have enjoyed political and cultural dominance over thirty years in Taiwan while the Hakkas have remained ‘weaker’ in Taiwanese society.

4 Language can be seen as the principal medium for thinking, identity, cultural values and historical culture. Hence, language policy is usually represented as the main tool of the state to influence and construct people's values. In 1945, the rule of the Japanese government in Taiwan came to an end with Japan's defeat in the Second World War, and the KMT government set up the 'Outline for Taking Over Taiwan' as the main policy framework:

Item 7: Official documents, textbooks and newspapers cannot be written in the Japanese language.

Item 44: The government should set up a national-language educational project as soon as possible, and the project should be put into practice within a limited time. Education in the national language will require courses in primary and high schools, and government officials will have to use the national language. The original 'Japanese Language Research Centres should be changed to 'National Language Research Centres', and should begin to train teachers of the national language.

These items became the basis of the KMT's language policy in Taiwan. Accordingly, the KMT government set up the 'Committee for the Promotion of National Language' in Taiwan, as well as 13 'National Language Research Centres' in every city and county, for training, education and supervision of the 'national language'. At the same time, language policy focused on the educational system and the administrative system in order to push 'national language' (Mandarin) as the 'public' or 'higher' language, and to ensure that other languages remained 'private' or 'lower' languages.

In the educational system, different policies were announced to promote the national language and forbid other languages. For example, teachers at all levels in the schools should use the national language in class, and the high schools should provide national-language courses for students, teachers and the common people (1946); and the Educational Office in Taiwan Province issued 'measures for the improvement of national language in the various levels of schools'. It ordered that teachers who could not speak the national language well had to meet new national criteria, and it required all students in teaching training colleges to pass exams in the national language (1949). New measures were issued to improve national education in schools; these required school governors to supervise, direct and assess the results of national-language policy (1952). The Educational Office in Taiwan Province amended the regulations for the primary and high schools, and decided that students who could not speak the national language would be awarded a 'demerit' or be punished (1955).

5 The KMT government wanted to set up a reservoir in Meinong, and undoubtedly this would have had a huge influence on the local environment and culture. Because 95% of the population in Meinong are Hakkas, they developed a close relationship with the Anti-Reservoir movement. This has reinforced the identity of the Hakkas in Meinong.
Today, there are about 100 million Hakka in the world including those in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. They still share the same language and a very close culture. The global Hakka associations are quite active and popular in Taiwan.

‘Hybridity’ and ‘hybrid culture’ are discussed by many researchers in cultural studies. Homi K. Bhabha, who was the first to use the term ‘hybridity’ in cultural studies, transformed the term from Bakhtin’s ‘intentional hybrid’ into an active moment of challenge and resistance against a dominant cultural power. Bhabha translated this moment into a ‘hybrid displacing space’ which develops in the interaction between the indigenous and colonial culture. He has since extended his notion of ‘hybridity to include forms of counter-authority’. E. Said and S. Hall also use this term. In Said’s phrase, ‘hybrid counter-energies’ challenge the centred, dominant cultural norms with their unsettling perplexities generated out of their ‘disjunctive, liminal space’. Hall use the term to discuss black cultural politics and diaspora experience. See Robert J.C. Young, ‘Hybridity and Diaspora’, in Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp.1--28.

The research compares the proportions of the ethnic population with the rate of use of different languages on the radio. It shows that the proportion of the ethnic population (the Hokkien: the mainlanders: the Hakka: the aborigines) are 73: 13:12:1.7, and the rate of their language use on the radio is 49.93: 46.73: 1.47: 0.44). See Liu, You-Li, A Survey of the Use and Satisfaction of the Hakka in the Media (Taipei: Research of the CCA, 1997), p.12. (Chinese)

In 1996, The Bureau of Information began to allow five private radio stations to broadcast Hakka programmes, and produced nine programmes.

In 1997, the Foundation of Radio and TV set up the Centre of Hakka Radio to provide Hakka programmes for the different channels. At the same time, Chinese Radio set up a Hakka channel, and the New Hakka Radio was also permitted. This became the first commercial Hakka channel.

The Taiwan TV Company produced the first Hakka TV Programee, ‘Native People and Native Feeling’ (Xiang Tu Feng Qing), in 1989 in response to the demands of the Hakka social movement. The Chinese TV Company also produced ‘Painting for the Hakka Culture’ (Kejia Wen Hua Zhi) in 1990. In 1991, the three TV companies began to broadcast Hakka news for 15 minutes every day. In 1996, ‘the Satellite of the Central Plains’ was set up as the only channel broadcasting in the Hakka language for the whole day. After public TV was set up in 1998, it provided some Hakka programmes, such as the Hakka News Magazine in 2001 and the first Hakka series – ‘Cool Nights’ (Han Ye) -- in 2002. From Chang, Jin-Hua, ‘Multiculturalism and the Media Policy of Taiwan -- A Case study of Taiwan Aborigines and the Hakka’, Radio and TV, Vol.3, No.1,1997, pp.8-10. (Chinese) and Liu, You-Li (1997), pp.167-172.

The right to cultural identity, we will suggest, includes the right to respect for one's culture, the right to respect cultural identity and identification with a cultural community. The right to cultural identity should be based on many factors, including a distinctive culture, or a cultural community, with which people can identify. This arises from the interaction between the whole society, the cultural community and individuals.

The right to access and participate in cultural life also raises several problems. First, it should include two components: the freedom to gain equal access to, and the opportunity to participate in, cultural life. Secondly, cultural life should include both the mainstream culture and the appropriate minority culture. This point is important since cultural rights based on minority culture are sometimes ignored. The tension between cultural rights based on majority culture and cultural rights based on minority culture should be considered as part of the right to access and participate in cultural life.

The right to represent, or be represented by, culture is related to the question of whether cultural difference can be recognised by the public sphere, i.e. through the mass media, laws or government. However, ‘to represent’ and ‘to be represented by’ are quite different. The former emphasises the power of people to represent themselves; and the second refers to the extent to which they are represented by others. In other words, this is a problem of cultural interpretation.

In the event of ‘Lin, Shuang, Wen’ (1786) and the event of ‘Zhu, Yi-gui’ (1721), which were two serious ethnic conflicts between the Hokkien and the Hakka, the Hakka were described as an ‘accessory' of the Ching Dynasty in oppressing the Hokkien.

The development of traditional drama is an example of this. Under Chinese nationalism, the KMT government prohibited TV stations from broadcasting Hokkien and Hakka dramas, but encouraged them to broadcast Chinese opera. From the 1990s, these limitations were abolished, and traditional Hokkien dramas, such as GeZaiXi, became very popular through the mass media. But the Hakka drama,
CaiChaXi, was still not permitted to be shown on television.

13 ‘Dong, Yue-hua’ is a female comedian played by an actor. The television programme hints that she is a Hakka, and uses her stupid, fat and vulgar appearance to make fun of her. However, this role causes much anger among the Hakkas.

14 The ‘Dong, Yue-hua’ incident caused widespread discussion in 1998. See Zhang, Jin-hua, ‘Discuss the “Dong, Yue-hua” phenomenon in terms of multiculturalism’ (a media-based study), China Times, 10 May 1998; Liu, Mei- Hui, ‘Spread ethnic justice, reduce ethnic misunderstanding’ (a sociological view), China Times, 30 April 1998; and, on the reaction of Hakka organisations, ‘The Taiwan Hakka Camps Reject “Dong, Yue-hua”’, China Times, 5 May 1998 (All in Chinese).

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